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Abstract. In this work, we show how to construct IBE schemes that
are secure against a bounded number of collusions, starting with under-
lying PKE schemes which possess linear homomorphisms over their keys.
In particular, this enables us to exhibit a new (bounded-collusion) IBE
construction based on the quadratic residuosity assumption, without any
need to assume the existence of random oracles. The new IBE's public
parameters are of size O(t log I) where I is the total number of identi-
ties which can be supported by the system, t is the number of collusions
which the system is secure against, and  is a security parameter. While
the number of collusions is bounded, we note that an exponential number
of total identities can be supported.
More generally, we give a transformation that takes any PKE satisfying
Linear Key Homomorphism, Identity Map Compatibility, and the Linear
Hash Proof Property and translates it into an IBE secure against bounded
collusions. We demonstrate that these properties are more general than
our quadratic residuosity-based scheme by showing how a simple PKE
based on the DDH assumption also satises these properties.
1 Introduction
The last decade in the lifetime of cryptography has been quite exciting. We are
witnessing a paradigm shift, departing from the traditional goals of secure and
authenticated communication and moving towards systems that are simultane-
ously highly secure, highly functional, and highly exible in allowing selected
access to encrypted data. As part of this development, dierent \types" of en-
cryption systems have been conceived and constructed to allow greater ability to
meaningfully manipulate and control access to encrypted data, such as bounded
and fully homomorphic encryption (FHE), identity-based encryption (IBE), hier-
archical identity-based encryption (HIBE), functional encryption (FE), attribute
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based encryption (ABE), and others. As is typical at any time of rapid innova-
tion, the eld is today at a somewhat chaotic state. The dierent primitives of
FHE, IBE, HIBE, FE, and ABE are being implemented based on dierent com-
putational assumptions and as of yet we do not know of general constructions.
One way to put some order in the picture is to investigate reductions between
the various primitives. A beautiful example of such a result was recently shown by
Rothblum [29], who demonstrated a simple reduction between any semantically
secure private key encryption scheme which possesses a simple homomorphic
property over its ciphertexts to a full-edged semantically secure public key
encryption scheme. The homomorphic property requires that the product of a
pair of ciphertexts c1 and c2, whose corresponding plaintexts are m1 and m2,
yields a new ciphertext c1  c2 which decrypts to m1 +m2 mod 2.
In this paper, we continue this line of investigation and show how public-key
encryption schemes which posses a linear homomorphic property over their keys
as well as hash proof system features with certain algebraic structure can be
used to construct an ecient identity-based encryption (IBE) scheme that is
secure against bounded collusions. The main idea is simple. In a nutshell, the
homomorphism over the keys will give us a way to map a set of public keys
published by the master authority in an IBE system into a new user-specic
public key that is obtained by taking a linear combination of the published keys.
By taking a linear combination instead of a subset, we are able to achieve smaller
keys than a strictly combinatorial approach would allow. Our constructions allow
the total number of potential identities to be exponential in the size of the
public parameters of the IBE. The challenge will be to prove that the resulting
cyptosystem is secure even in the presence of a specied number of colluding
users. For this, we rely on an algebraic hash proof property.
To explain our results in the context of the known literature, let us quickly
review some relevant highlights in the history of IBEs. The Identity-Based En-
cryption model was conceived by Shamir in the early 1980s [30]. The rst con-
structions were proposed in 2001 by Boneh and Franklin [6] based on the hard-
ness of the bilinear Die-Hellman problem and by Cocks [13] based on the
hardness of the quadratic residuosity problem. Both works relied on the random
oracle model. Whereas the quadratic residuosity problem has been used in the
context of cryptography since the early eighties [22], computational problems
employing bilinear pairings were at the time of [6] relative newcomers to the
eld. Indeed, inspired by their extensive usage within the context of IBEs, the
richness of bilinear group problems has proved tremendously useful for solving
other cryptographic challenges (e.g. in the area of leakage-resilient systems).
Removing the assumption that random oracles exist in the construction of
IBEs and their variants was the next theoretical target. A long progression of
results ensued. At rst, partial success for IBE based on bilinear group assump-
tions was achieved by producing IBEs in the standard model provably satisfying
a more relaxed security condition known as selective security [11, 4], whereas
the most desirable of security guarantees is that any polynomial-time attacker
who can request secret keys for identities of its choice cannot launch a successful
chosen-ciphertext attack (CCA) against a new adaptively-chosen challenge iden-
tity. Enlarging the arsenal of computational complexity bases for IBE, Gentry,
Peikert, and Vaikuntanathan [21] proposed an IBE based on the intractability
of the learning with errors (LWE) problem, still in the random oracle model. Ul-
timately, fully (unrelaxed) secure IBEs were constructed in the standard model
(without assuming random oracles) under the decisional Bilinear Die-Hellman
assumption by Boneh and Boyen [5] and Waters [34], and most recently under
the LWE assumption by Cash, Hofheinz, Kiltz, and Peikert [12] and Agrawal,
Boneh, and Boyen [1]. Constructing a fully secure (or even selectively secure)
IBE without resorting to the random oracle model based on classical number
theoretic assumptions such as DDH in non-bilinear groups or the hardness of
quadratic residuosity assumptions remains open.
A dierent relaxation of IBE comes up in the work of Dodis, Katz, Xu, and
Yung [16] in the context of their study of the problem of a bounded number of se-
cret key exposures in public-key encryption. To remedy the latter problem, they
introduced the notion of key-insulated PKE systems and show its equivalence to
IBEs semantically secure against a bounded number of colluding identities. This
equivalence coupled with constructions of key-insulated PKE's by [16] yields a
generic combinatorial construction which converts any semantic secure PKE to
a bounded-collusion semantic secure IBE, without needing a random oracle.
New Results The goal of our work is to point to a new direction in the con-
struction of IBE schemes: the utilization of homomorphic properties over keys of
PKE schemes (when they exist) to obtain IBE constructions. This may provide
a way to diversify the assumptions on which IBEs can be based. In particular,
we are interested in obtaining IBE constructions based on quadratic residuosity
in the standard model.
In recent years, several PKE schemes were proposed with interesting ho-
momorphisms over the public keys and the underlying secret keys. These were
constructed for the purpose of showing circular security and leakage resilience
properties. In particular, for both the scheme of Boneh, Halevi, Hamburg, and
Ostrovski [8] and the scheme of Brakerski and Goldwasser [9], it can be shown
that starting with two valid (public-key, secret-key) pairs (pk1; sk1); (pk2; sk2),
one can obtain a third valid pair as (pk1  pk2; sk1 + sk2).
We dene properties of a PKE scheme allowing homomorphism over keys
that suce to transform the PKE into an IBE scheme with bounded collusion
resistance. As examples of our general framework, we show how to turn the
schemes of [8] and a modication of [9] into two IBE schemes in the standard
model (that is, without random oracles), which are CPA secure against bounded
collusions. Namely, security holds when the adversary is restricted to receive t
secret keys for identities of its choice for a pre-specied t. We allow the adversary
to choose its attack target adaptively. The security of the scheme we present here
is based on the intractability of the quadratic residuosity problem. In the full
version of this paper, we also present a second scheme with security based on the
intractability of DDH. Letting the public parameters of the IBE be of size O(n)
where  is a security parameter, the new DDH-based IBE will be secure as long
as the adversary is restricted to receive t secret keys for adaptively chosen ID's
where t = n   1. The QR-based IBE will be secure as long as the adversary is
restricted to receive t secret keys for t = nlog I   1, where I is the total number
of users (or identities) that can be supported by the system. There is no upper
bound on I, which can be exponential in the size of public parameters.
Let us compare what we achieve to the constructions obtained by [16]. In
their generic combinatorial construction, they start with any PKE and obtain
a bounded-collusion IBE, requiring public parameters to be of size O(t2 log I)
times the size of public keys in the PKE scheme and secret keys to be of size
O(t log I) times the size of secret keys in the PKE scheme for t collusions and I
total identities supported. Their approach employs explicit constructions of sets
S1; : : : ; SI of some nite universe U such that the union of any t of these does not
cover any additional set. There is a public key of the PKE scheme generated for
each element of U , and each set Si corresponds to a set of jSij PKE secret keys.
There are are intrinsic bounds on the values of I; jU j; t for which this works, and
[16] note that their values of jU j = (t2 log I) and jSij = (t log I) for each i
are essentially optimal. In contrast, by exploiting the algebraic homomorphisms
over the keys, we require public parameters of size roughly O(t  log I) times the
size of public keys and secret keys which are O() (within a constant times the
size of PKE secret keys) for our quadratic residuosity based scheme. (This is
assuming a certain relationship between the security parameter  and n. See the
statement of Theorem 2 for details.)
In [16], they also provide a DDH-based key-insulated PKE scheme which is
more ecient than their generic construction. It has O(t) size public parameters
and O() size secret keys. Viewing their scheme in the identity based context
results in, perhaps surprisingly, the DDH based scheme we obtain by exploiting
the homomorphism over the keys in BBHO [8]. In the full version of this paper,
we describe this scheme and show it can be proved secure against t collusions
using our framework.
1.1 Overview of the Techniques
The basic idea is to exploit homomorphism over the keys in a PKE system .
The high-level overview is as follows.
Start with a PKE  with the following properties:
1. The secret keys are vectors of elements in a ring R with operations (+; )
and the public keys consist of elements in a group G.
2. If (pk1; sk1) and (pk2; sk2) are valid keypairs of  and a; b 2 R, then ask1+
bsk2 is also a valid secret key of , with a corresponding public key that
can be eciently computed from pk1; pk2; a; b. For the schemes we present,
this public key is computed as pka1  pkb2.
We note that many existing cryptosystems have this property, or can be made
to have this property with trivial modications, including [8], [9], and [14].
The trusted master authority in an IBE will then choose n pairs of (pki; ski)
(i = 1; :::; n) using the key generation algorithm of , publish the n pki values,
and keep secret the corresponding n ski's. Each identity is mapped to a vector
id1:::idn in R
n (we abuse terminology slightly here since R is only required to be
a ring and not a eld, but we will still call these \vectors"). The secret key for
the identity is computed as a coordinate-wise linear combination of the vectors
sk1; : : : ; skn, with coecients id1; : : : ; idn respectively, i.e.
SKID :=
nX
i=1
(ski  idi)
where all additions take place in R.
Anyone can compute the matching public key PKID using the key ho-
momorphism and the published pki values. Since by the key homomorphism
(PKID; SKID) is still a valid key pair for the original PKE, encryption and
decryption can function identically to before. The encryptor simply runs the
encryption algorithm for  using PKID, and the decryptor runs the decryption
algorithm for  using SKID.
We refer to the combination of a PKE scheme with this homomorphic prop-
erty over keys and a mapping for identities as having the linear key homomor-
phism and identity map compatibility properties. To prove security for the re-
sulting bounded-collusion IBE construction, one can intuitively see that we need
the map taking identities to vectors to produce linearly independent outputs for
any distinct t+1 identities. This is required to ensure that any t colluding users
will not be able to compute a secret key for another user as a known linear
combination of their own secret keys. To obtain our full security proof, we dene
an algebraic property of the PKE scheme in combination with the identity map,
called the linear hash proof property, which encompasses this requirement on any
t + 1 images of the map and more. The denition of this property is inspired
by the paradigm of hash proof systems (introduced by Cramer and Shoup [14]),
though it diers from this in many ways. We dene valid and invalid ciphertexts
for our systems, where valid ciphertexts decrypt properly and invalid ciphertexts
should decrypt randomly over the set of many secret keys corresponding to a sin-
gle public key. We require that valid and invalid ciphertexts are computationally
indistinguishable. So far this is quite similar to the previous uses of hash proof
systems. However, the identity-based setting introduces a further challenge in
proving security by changing to an invalid ciphertext, since now the adversary's
view additionally includes the secret keys that it may request for other identi-
ties. Hence, we must prove that an invalid ciphertext decrypts randomly over
the subset of secret keys that are consistent not only with the public keys, but
also with the received secret keys.
Controlling the behavior over this set of consistent keys in the QR-based set-
ting is particularly challenging, where the mathematical analysis is quite subtle
due to the fact that secret keys must be treated as integers in a bounded range
while public keys are elements of a subgroup of ZN . To prove the linear hash
proof property for our QR-based system, we employ technical bounds concerning
the intersection of a shifted lattice in Zn with a \bounding box" of elements of
Zn whose coordinates all lie within a specied nite range.
1.2 Other Related Work
In addition to those referenced above, constructions of IBE schemes in the stan-
dard model in the bilinear setting were also provided by Gentry [20] under the
q-ABHDE assumption, and by Waters [35] under the bilinear Die-Hellman and
decisional linear assumptions. Another construction based on quadratic residu-
osity in the random oracle model was provided by Boneh, Gentry, and Hamburg
[7]. Leakage-resilient IBE schemes in various models have also been constructed,
for example by Alwen, Dodis, Naor, Segev, Walsh, and Wichs [2], by Brakerski,
Kalai, Katz, and Vaikuntanathan [10], and by Lewko, Rouselakis, and Waters
[26].
The property we require for our PKE schemes in addition to key homo-
morphism is a variant of the structure of hash proof systems, which were rst
introduced by Cramer and Shoup as a paradigm for proving CCA security of
PKE schemes [14]. Hash proof systems have recently been used in the context
of leakage-resilience as well ([28], for example), extending to the identity-based
setting in [2]. We note that the primitive of identity-based hash proof systems
introduced in [2] takes a dierent direction than our work, and the instantiation
they provide from the quadratic residuosity assumption relies on the random
oracle model.
The relaxation to bounded collusion resistance has also been well-studied
in the context of broadcast encryption and revocation schemes, dating back to
the introduction of broadcast encryption by Fiat and Naor [17]. This work and
several follow up works employed combinatorial techniques [31{33, 18, 25, 19].
Another combinatorial approach, the subset cover framework, was introduced by
Naor, Naor, and Lopspeich [27] to build a revocation scheme. In this framework,
users are associated with subsets of keys. The trusted system designer can then
broadcast an encrypted message by selecting a family of subsets which covers all
the desired recipients and none of the undesired ones. An improvement to the
NNL scheme was later given by Halevy and Shamir [24], and these techniques
were then extended to the public key setting by Dodis and Fazio [15].
2 Preliminaries
2.1 IND-CPA Security for Bounded-Collusion IBE
We dene IND-CPA security for bounded-collusion IBE in terms of the follow-
ing game between a challenger and an attacker. We let t denote our threshold
parameter for collusion resistance. The game proceeds in phases:
Setup Phase The challenger runs the setup algorithm to produce the public
parameters and master secret key. It gives the public parameters to the attacker.
Query Phase I The challenger initializes a counter to be 0. The attacker may then
submit key queries for various identities. In response to a key query, the chal-
lenger increments its counter. If the resulting counter value is  t, the challenger
generates a secret key for the requested identity by running the key generation
algorithm. It gives the secret key to the attacker. If the counter value is > t, it
does not respond to the query.
Challenge Phase The attacker species messages m0;m1 and an identity ID

that was not queried in the preceding query phase. The challenger chooses a ran-
dom bit b 2 f0; 1g, encrypts mb to identity ID using the encryption algorithm,
and gives the ciphertext to the attacker.
Query Phase II The attacker may again submit key queries for various identities
not equal to ID, and the challenger will respond as in the rst query phase. We
note that the same counter is employed, so that only t total queries in the game
are answered with secret keys.
Guess The attacker outputs a guess b0 for b.
We dene the advantage of an attacker A in the above game to be AdvA =Pr[b = b0]  12 . We say a bounded-collusion IBE system with parameter t is
secure if any PPT attacker A has only a negligible advantage in this game.
2.2 Complexity Assumption
We formally state the QR assumption. We let  denote the security parameter.
Quadratic Residuosity Assumption We let N = pq where p; q are random -bit
primes. We require p; q  3 (mod 4), i.e. N is a Blum integer. We let JN denote
the elements of ZN with Jacobi symbol equal to 1, and we let QRN denote the
set of quadratic residues modulo N . Both of these are multiplicative subgroups
of ZN , with orders
(N)
2 and
(N)
4 respectively. We note that
(N)
4 is odd, and
that  1 is an element of JN , but is not a square modulo N . As a consequence,
JN is isomorphic to f+1; 1g  QRN . We let u denote an element of QRN
chosen uniformly at random, and h denote an element of JN chosen uniformly
at random. For any algorithm A, we dene the advantage of A against the QR
problem to be:
AdvAN jPr [A(N; u) = 1]  Pr [A(N;h) = 1]j :
We further restrict our choice of N to values such that QRN is cyclic. We
note that this is satised when p; q are strong primes, meaning p = 2p0 + 1; q =
2q0+1, where p; q; p0; q0 are all distinct odd primes. This restriction was previously
imposed in [14], where they note that this restricted version implies the usual
formulation of the quadratic residuosity assumption if one additionally assumes
that strong primes are suciently dense. We say that the QR assumption holds
if for all PPT A, AdvAN is negligible in .
Furthermore, we note that this denition is equivalent to one in which A
receives a random element h of JNnQRN instead of JN .
2.3 Mapping Identities to Linearly Independent Vectors
To employ our strategy of transforming PKE schemes with homomorphic prop-
erties over keys into IBE schemes with polynomial collusion resistance, we rst
need methods for eciently mapping identities to linearly independent vectors
over various elds. This can be done using generating matrices for the Reed-
Solomon codes over Zp and dual BCH codes over Z2. The proofs of the following
lemmas can be found in the full version.
Lemma 1. For any prime p and any t + 1 < p, there exists an eciently-
computable mapping f : Zp ! Zt+1p such that for any distinct x1; x2; :::xt+1 2 Zp,
the vectors f(x1); f(x2); :::f(xt+1) are linearly independent.
Lemma 2. For any positive integer k and any t + 1 < 2k, there exists an
eciently-computable mapping f : f0; 1gk ! f0; 1g(t+1)k such that for any dis-
tinct x1; x2; :::xt+1 2 f0; 1gk, the vectors f(x1); f(x2); :::f(xt+1) are linearly in-
dependent over Z2.
3 From PKE to Bounded Collusion IBE: General
Conditions and Construction
We start with a public key scheme and an eciently computable mapping f
on identities that jointly have the following useful properties. We separate the
public keys of the PKE into public parameters (distributed independently of the
secret key) and user-specic data; the latter is referred to as the \public key".
3.1 Linear Key Homomorphism
We say a PKE has linear key homomorphism if the following requirements hold.
First, its secret keys are generated randomly from d-tuples of a ring R for some
positive integer d, with a distribution that is independent and uniform in each
coordinate over some subset R0 of R. Second, starting with any two secret keys
sk1; sk2 each in R
d and any r1; r2 2 R, the component-wise R-linear combination
formed by r1sk1+r2sk2 also functions as a secret key, with a corresponding public
key that can be computed eciently from r1; r2 and the public keys pk1 and pk2
of sk1 and sk2 respectively, xing the same public parameters. We note that
r1sk1+ r2sk2 may not have all entries in R
0, but it should still function properly
as a key.
3.2 Identity Map Compatibility
We say the identity mapping f is compatible with a PKE scheme with linear
key homomorphism if f maps identities into n-tuples of elements of R. Letting
I denote the number of identities, the action of f can be represented by a I  n
matrix with entries in R. We denote this matrix by F and its rows by f1; : : : ;f I .
3.3 Linear Hash Proof Property
We now dene the strongest property we require, which we call the linear hash
proof property. This property is inspired by the paradigm of hash proof systems,
but we deviate from that paradigm in several respects. In hash proof systems,
a single public key corresponds to many possible secret keys. There are two en-
cryption algorithms: a valid one and an invalid one. Valid ciphertexts decrypt
properly when one uses any of the secret keys associated to the public key, while
invalid ciphertexts decrypt dierently when dierent secret keys are used. Our
linear hash proof property will consider several public keys at once, each corre-
sponding to a set of many possible secret keys. The adversary will be given these
public keys, along with some linear combinations of xed secret keys correspond-
ing to the public keys. We will also have valid and invalid encryption algorithms.
Our valid ciphertexts will behave properly. When an invalid ciphertext is formed
for a public key corresponding to a linear combination of the secret keys that
is independent of the revealed combinations, the invalid ciphertext will decrypt
\randomly" when one chooses a random key from the set of secret keys that are
consistent with the adversary's view.
To dene this property more formally, we rst need to dene some addi-
tional notation. We consider a PKE scheme with linear key homomorphism
which comes equipped with a compatible identity map f and an additional algo-
rithm InvalidEncrypt which takes in a message and a secret key sk and outputs a
ciphertext (note that the invalid encryption algorithm does not necessarily need
to be ecient). The regular and invalid encryption algorithms produce two dis-
tributions of ciphertexts. We call these valid and invalid ciphertexts. Correctness
of decryption must hold for valid ciphertexts.
We let (sk1; pk1); (sk2; pk2); : : : ; (skn; pkn) be n randomly generated key pairs,
where all of sk1; : : : ; skn are d-tuples in a ring R (here we assume that the key
generation algorithm chooses R; d and then generates a key pair. We x R and
then run the rest of the algorithm independently n times to produce the n key
pairs). We dene S to be the n  d matrix with entries in R whose ith row
contains ski.
Fix any t + 1 distinct rows of the matrix of identity vectors F , denoted
by f i1 ; : : : ;f it+1 . We let skIDit+1 denote the secret key f it+1  S and pkIDit+1
denote the corresponding public key (computed via the key homomorphism).
We let KerR(f i1 ; : : : ;f it) denote the kernel of the tn submatrix of F formed
by these rows; that is, it consists of the vectors v 2 Rn such that f ij  v = 0 for
all j from 1 to t.
Now we consider the set of possible secret key matrices given the public
and secret key information available to an adversary who has queried identities
i1; :::; it. We let W denote the set of matrices in R
nd whose columns belong to
KerR(f i1 ; : : : ;f it) and whose rows wi satisfy that ski+wi has the same public
key as ski for all i. Since W 's columns are orthogonal to the identity vectors
f i1 ; : : : ;f it , adding an element of W to S does not change any of the secret
keys fijS. Furthermore, by construction, adding an element of W to S does not
change the public keys associated with the scheme.
We dene the subset ~S of Rnd to be the set of all matrices in S +W :=
fS +W0jW0 2Wg, intersected with the set of all matrices of n secret keys that
can be generated by the key generation algorithm (i.e. those with components in
R0). Intuitively, ~S is the set of all possible nd secret key matrices that are \con-
sistent" with the n public keys pk1; : : : ; pkn and the t secret keys f i1 S; : : : ;f it S.
In other words, after seeing these values, even an information-theoretic adversary
cannot determine S uniquely - only the set ~S can be determined.
We say that a PKE scheme with linear key homomorphism is a lin-
ear hash proof system with respect to the compatible map f if the
following two requirements are satised. We refer to these requirements as uni-
form decryption of invalid ciphertexts and computational indistinguishability of
valid/invalid ciphertexts.
Uniform Decryption of Invalid Ciphertexts With all but negligible probability
over the choice of sk1; pk1; : : : ; skn; pkn and the random coins of the invalid
encryption algorithm, for any choice of distinct rows f i1 ; : : : ;f it+1 of F , an
invalid ciphertext encrypted to pkIDit+1 must decrypt to a message distributed
negligibly close to uniform over the message space when decrypted with a secret
key chosen at random from f it+1  ~S. More precisely, an element of ~S is chosen
uniformly at random, and the resulting matrix is multiplied on the left by f it+1
to produce the secret key.
Computational Indistinguishability of Valid/Invalid Ciphertexts Second, we re-
quire valid and invalid ciphertexts are computationally indistinguishable in the
following sense. For any xed (distinct) f i1 ; : : : ;f it+1 , we consider the following
game between a challenger and an attacker A:
Gamehp: The challenger starts by sampling (sk1; pk1); : : : ; (skn; pkn) as above,
and gives the attacker the public parameters and pk1; : : : ; pkn. The attacker may
adaptively choose distinct rows f i1 ; : : : ;f it+1 in F in any order it likes. (For con-
venience, we let f it+1 always denote the vector that will be encrypted under, but
we note that this may be chosen before some of the other f i's.) Upon setting an
f ij for j 6= t+1, the attacker receives f ij S. When it sets f it+1 , it also chooses
a message m. At this point, the challenger ips a coin  2 f0; 1g, and encrypts
m to the public key corresponding to f it+1 S as follows. We let pkch denote the
public key corresponding to f it+1  S. If  = 0, it calls Encrypt with m; pkch. If
 = 1, it calls InvalidEncrypt with m;f it+1  S. It gives the resulting ciphertext
to the attacker, who produces a guess 0 for .
We denote the advantage of the attacker by AdvhpA =
P[ = 0]  12  : We
require that AdvhpA be negligible for all PPT attackers A.
3.4 Construction
Given a PKE scheme (KeyGen, Encrypt, Decrypt) and an identity mapping f
having the properties dened above, we now construct a bounded-collusion IBE
scheme. We let t denote our collusion parameter, and n will be the dimension of
the image of f .
Setup()! PP;MSK The setup algorithm for the IBE scheme calls the key gen-
eration algorithm of the PKE scheme to generate n random sk1; pk1; : : : ; skn; pkn
pairs, sharing the same public parameters. The public parameters PP of the IBE
scheme are dened to be these shared public parameters as well as pk1; : : : ; pkn.
The master secret key MSK is the collection of secret keys sk1; : : : ; skn.
KeyGen(ID;MSK)! SKID The key generation algorithm takes an identity in
the domain of f and rst maps it into Rn as f(ID) = (id1; : : : ; idn). It then
computes SKID as an R-linear combination of sk1; : : : ; skn, with coecients
id1; : : : ; idn: SKID =
Pn
i=1 idiski:
Encrypt(m;PP; ID)! CT The encryption algorithm takes in a message in the
message space of the PKE scheme. From the public parameters PP, it computes a
public key corresponding to SKID using the linear key homomorphism property
(we note that the mapping f is known and eciently computable). It then runs
the PKE encryption algorithm on m with this public key to produce CT.
Decrypt(CT;SKID) ! m The decryption algorithm runs the decryption algo-
rithm of the PKE, using SKID as the secret key.
3.5 Security
Theorem 1. When a PKE scheme (KeyGen, Encrypt, Decrypt) with linear
key homomorphism and a compatible identity mapping f satisfy the linear hash
proof property, then the construction dened in Section 3.4 is a secure bounded-
collusion IBE scheme with collusion parameter t.
Proof. We rst change from the real security game dened in Section 2.1 to
a new Game0 in which the challenger calls the invalid encryption algorithm to
form an invalid ciphertext. We argue that if the adversary's advantage changes
by a non-negligible amount, this violates the computational indistinguishabil-
ity of valid/invalid ciphertexts. To see this, we consider a PPT adversary A
whose advantage changes non-negligibly. We will construct a PPT adversary A0
against Gamehp. The challenger for Gamehp gives A0 the public parameters and
pk1; : : : ; pkn, which A0 forwards to A. When A requests a secret key for an iden-
tity corresponding to f ij , A0 can forward f ij to its challenger and obtain the
corresponding secret key. When A declares m0;m1 and some ID corresponding
to f it+1 , A0 chooses a random bit b 2 f0; 1g and sends mb;f it+1 to its chal-
lenger. It receives a ciphertext encrypting mb, which it forwards to A. We note
here that the t+1 distinct identities chosen by A correspond to distinct rows of
F . If the challenger for A0 is calling the regular encryption algorithm, then A0
has properly simulated the real security game for A. If it is calling the invalid
encryption algorithm, then A0 has properly simulated the new game, Game0.
Hence, if A has a non-negligible change in advantage, A0 can leverage this to
obtain a non-negligible advantage in Gamehp.
In Game0, we argue that information-theoretically, the attacker's advantage
must be negligible. We observe that in our denition of the linear hash proof
property, the subset ~S of Rnd is precisely the subset of possible MSK's that
are consistent with the public parameters and requested secret keys that the
attacker receives in the game, and each of these is equally likely. Since the invalid
ciphertext decrypts to an essentially random message over this set (endowed with
the uniform distribution), the attacker cannot have a non-negligible advantage
in distinguishing the message.
4 QR-based Construction
We now present a PKE scheme with linear key homomorphism and a compatible
identity mapping f such that this is a linear hash proof system with respect to
f under the quadratic residuosity assumption.
QR-based PKE Construction We dene the message space to be f 1; 1g. The
public parameters of the scheme are a Blum integer N = pq, where primes
p; q  3 mod 4 and QRN is cyclic, and an element g that is a random quadratic
residue modulo N . Our public keys will be elements of ZN , while our secret keys
are elements of the ring R := Z. We dene the subset R0 to be [(N)]. We will
later provide bounds for appropriate settings of (N).
{ Gen(1): The generation algorithm chooses an element sk uniformly at ran-
dom in [(N)]. This is the secret key. It then calculates the public key as
pk = gsk.
{ Encpk(m): The encryption algorithm chooses an odd r 2 [N2] uniformly at
random, and calculates Enc(m) = (gr;m  pkr).
{ Decsk(c1; c2): The decryption algorithm computes m = c2  (csk1 ) 1.
We additionally dene the invalid encryption algorithm:
{ InvalidEncsk(m): The invalid encryption algorithm chooses a random h 2
JNnQRN (i.e. a random non-square). It produces the invalid ciphertext as
h;m  hsk.
Key Homomorphism Considering N , g as global parameters and only pk = gsk
as the public key, we have homomorphism over keys through multiplication and
exponentiation in G for public keys and arithmetic over the integers for secret
keys.
For secret keys sk1; sk2 2 Z and integers a; b 2 Z, we can form the secret key
sk3 := ask1 + bsk2 and corresponding public key pk3 = pk
a
1  pkb2 in G.
4.1 Compatible Mapping and Resulting IBE Construction
Our compatible map f is obtained from Lemma 2 (Section 2.3). We may assume
that our identities are hashed to f0; 1gk for some k using a collision-resistant
hash function, so they are in the domain of f . The image of each identity under
f is a vector with 0,1 entries of length n = k(t + 1), where t is our collusion
parameter. For every t+1 distinct elements of f0; 1gk, their images under f are
linearly independent (over Z2 as well as Q).
A formal description of our construction follows. This is an instance of the
general construction in Section 3.4, but we state it explicitly here for the reader's
convenience. We assume that messages to be encrypted are elements of f 1;+1g,
and identities are elements of f0; 1gk. For each identity ID, we let IDT denote
the row vector of length n over f0; 1g obtained by our mapping from f0; 1gk to
binary vectors of length n.
Setup The setup algorithm chooses a Blum integer N such that QRN is cyclic
and a random element g 2 QRN . It then generates n key pairs of the PKE
((pk1; sk1); (pk2; sk2); :::(pkn; skn)) using the common g, and publishes the public
keys (along with N , g) as the public parameters. The master secret key consists
of the corresponding secret keys, sk1; : : : ; skn. These form an n1 vector S with
entries in [(N)] (the ith component of S is equal to ski for i = 1 : : : n).
KeyGen(ID) The key generation algorithm receives an ID 2 f0; 1gk. By Lemma
2 (Section 2.3), we then have a mapping f that takes this ID to a vector
(id1; id2; :::idn), such that the vectors corresponding to t + 1 dierent ID's are
linearly independent. The secret key for ID will be an element of Z, which is
computed as a linear combination of the values sk1; : : : ; skn, with coecients
id1; : : : ; idn respectively. We express this as SKID :=
nX
i=1
(ski  idi); where the
sum is taken over Z. Since the mapping f provided in Section 2.3 produces vec-
tors (id1; : : : ; idn) with 0,1 entries, the value of SKID is at most (N)n. Since n
will be much less than (N), this will require roughly log (N) bits to represent.
Encrypt(ID;m;PP) We let PKID :=
nY
i=1
(pkidii ). Anyone can compute this using
the multiplicative key homomorphism and the published pki values. Since by the
key homomorphism (PKID; SKID) is still a valid keypair for the original PKE,
encryption and decryption can function as for the PKE. In other words, the
encryptor runs the encryption algorithm for the PKE scheme with PKID as the
public key to produce the ciphertext CT.
Note that for ciphertexts, we now have
EncPKID (m) = (g
r;m  ((PKID)r))
=
 
gr;m 
nY
i=1
(pkidiri )
!
=
 
gr;m 
nY
i=1
gidiskir
!
:
All arithmetic here takes place modulo N .
This can alternately be expressed as: EncPKID (m) =

gr;m  g(ID)TSr

where S = (ski)n1 is a vector over Z containing the n PKE secret keys of
the master secret key.
Decrypt(CT;SKID) The decryption algorithm runs the decryption algorithm of
the PKE with SKID as the secret key.
4.2 Security of the IBE
We now prove security of IBE scheme up to t collusions. This will follow from
Theorem 1 and the theorem below.
Theorem 2. Under the QR assumption, the PKE construction in Section 4 is a
linear hash proof system with respect to f when (N) is suciently large. When
log(N) = 
(n2 logn), (N) = N ` for some constant ` suces.
We note that when (N) = N `, our secret keys are of size O(logN) = O().
We prove this theorem in two lemmas.
Lemma 3. Under the QR assumption, computational indistinguishability of valid
and invalid ciphertexts holds.
Proof. We suppose there exists a PPT adversary A with non-negligible advan-
tage in Gamehp. We will create a PPT algorithm B with non-negligible advan-
tage against the QR assumption. We simplify/abuse notation a bit by letting
f1; : : : ;f t+1 denote the distinct rows of f that are chosen adaptively byA during
the course of the game (these were formerly called f i1 ; : : : ;f it+1).
B is given (N;h), where N is a Blum integer such that QRN is cyclic and h is
either a random element of JNnQRN or a random element of QRN . Crucially, B
does not know the factorization of N . B sets g to be a random element of QRN .
It chooses an n  1 vector S = (ski), whose entries are chosen uniformly
at random from [(N)]. For each i from 1 to n, the ith entry of S is denoted
by ski. It computes pki = g
ski mod N and gives the public parameters PP =
(N; g; pk1; : : : ; pkn) to A. We note that B knows the MSK = S, so it can compute
f1 S; : : : ;f t S and give these to A whenever A chooses the vectors f1; : : : ;f t.
At some point, A declares a message m and a vector f t+1 corresponding to
identity ID. B encrypts m using the following ciphertext:

h;m  h(IDT)S

:
We consider two cases, depending on the distribution of h.
Case 1: h is random in QRN When h is a random square modulo N , we claim
that the ciphertext is properly distributed as a valid ciphertext. More precisely,
we claim that the distribution of h and the distribution of gr for a random odd
r 2 [N2] are negligibly close. This follows from the fact that QRN is cyclic of
order (N)4 , and the reduction of a randomly chosen odd r 2 [N2] modulo (N)4
will be distributed negligibly close to uniform.
Case 2: h is random in JNnQRN In this case, B has followed the specication
of the invalid encryption algorithm.
Thus, if A has a non-negligible advantage in distinguishing between valid and
invalid ciphertexts, then B can leverage A to obtain non-negligible advantage
against the QR assumption.
Lemma 4. Uniform decryption of invalid ciphertexts holds when (N) is suf-
ciently large. When log(N) = 
(n2 log n), (N) = N ` for some constant `
suces.
Proof. We choose S with uniformly random entries in [(N)]. We then x any
t+1 distinct rows of F , denoted by f1; : : : ;f t+1. We must argue that the value
of f t+1 S modulo 2 is negligibly close to uniform, conditioned on f1 S; : : : ;f t S
and S modulo (N)4 . To see why this is an equivalent statement of the uniform
decryption of invalid ciphertexts property for our construction, note that the
decryption of an invalid ciphertext is computed as follows. We let sk denote the
secret key the ciphertext was generated with, and sk denote another secret key
for the same public key used for decryption:Dec(sk; (h;mhsk)) = m( 1)sk sk ;
since sk  sk mod (N)=4 in order to both have the same public key. If we think
of S as xed and ~S as the set of vectors with entries in [(N)] that yield the
same values of f1  S; : : : ;f t  S and S modulo (N)4 , we can restate our goal as
showing that the distribution of f t+1  S0 mod 2 is negligibly close to uniform,
where S0 is chosen uniformly at random from ~S.
We know by Lemma 2 that the vectors f1; : : : ;f t+1 are linearly independent
as vectors over Z2. This implies that these vectors are linearly independent as
vectors over Q as well. We let KerQ(f1; : : : ;f t) denote the (n  t)-dimensional
kernel of these vectors as a subspace of Qn.
Our strategy is to prove that this space contains a vector p with integer
entries that is not orthogonal to f t+1 modulo 2. Then, for every S
0 in S +W ,
S0+ (N)4 p is also in S+W . Here we are using the notation from Section 3 where
we dened W . In this instance, S +W is the set of vectors yielding the same
values as S for f1  S; : : : ;f t  S and S modulo (N)4 . ~S is then the intersection
of S +W with the set of vectors having all of their entries in [(N)].
To complete the argument, we need to prove that for most elements of S0 2 ~S
(all but a negligible proportion), S0 + (N)4 p will also be in ~S (i.e. have entries
in [(N)]). This will follow from showing that there exists a p with reasonably
bounded entries, and also that the set ~S contains mostly vectors whose entries
stay a bit away from the boundaries of the region [(N)].
We will use the following lemmas. The proof the second can be found in the
full version.
Lemma 5. Let A be a tn matrix of rank t over Q with entries in f0; 1g. Then
there exists a basis for the kernel of A consisting of vectors with integral entries
all bounded by n
t
2 t
t
4 .
Proof. This is an easy consequence of Theorem 2 in [3], which implies the exis-
tence of a basis with entries all bounded in absolute value by
p
det(AAT). We
note that AAT is a t t matrix with integral entries between 0 and n. Dividing
each row by n, we obtain a matrix with rational entries between 0 and 1, and
can then apply Hadamard's bound [23] to conclude that the determinant of this
rational matrix has absolute value at most t
t
2 . Thus, the determinant of AAT
has absolute value at most ntt
t
2 . Applying Theorem 2 in [3], the lemma follows.
Lemma 6. We suppose that M is dn matrix with integral entries all of abso-
lute value at most B and rank d over Q. Then there exists another dn matrix
M 0 with integral entries of absolute value at most 2d 1B that has the same rows-
pan as M over Q and furthermore remains rank d when its entries are reduced
modulo 2.
Combining these two lemmas, we may conclude that there exists a basis
for KerQ(f1; : : : ;f t) with integral entries all having absolute value at most
C := 2n t 1n
t
2 t
t
4 that remains of rank n  t when reduced modulo 2. Now, if all
of these basis vectors are orthogonal to f t+1 modulo 2, then these form a (n t)-
dimensional space that is contained in the kernel of the (t+1)-dimensional space
generated by f1; : : : ;f t;f t+1 in Zn2 . This is a contradiction. Thus, at least one
of the basis vectors is not orthogonal to f t+1 modulo 2. Since it is orthogonal
to f1; : : : ;f t over Q and has integral entries of absolute value at most C, this is
our desired p.
Now, the set of vectors ~S can be described as the intersection of the set
S +
(N)
4
KerZ(f1; : : : ;f t)
with the set of vectors with coordinates all in [(N)], where KerZ(f1; : : : ;f t)
denotes the vectors in KerQ(f1; : : : ;f t) with integral entries. Since we have a
bound C on the size of entries an integer basis for the kernel, we can argue
that if the coordinates of S are suciently bounded away from 0 and (N),
then there will be many vectors in ~S, negligibly few of which themselves have
entries outside of ((N)4 C; (N)  (N)4 C). Both this bound and the probability
that S is indeed suciently bounded away from 0 and (N) depend only on the
relationship between n and (N). In the full version of this paper, we prove the
following lemma:
Lemma 7. With (N), n, p, S, and ~S dened as above, when logN = 
(n2 log n),
we can set (N) = N ` for some constant ` so that the fraction of S0 2 ~S such
that S0 + (N)4 p is not also in ~S is negligible with all but negligible probability
over the choice of S.
Thus, ignoring negligible factors, we can consider ~S as partitioned into pairs
of the form S0 and S0 + (N)4 p. For each S
0, the values of f t+1  S0 and f t+1 
S0 + (N)4 p

modulo 2 are dierent. Thus, the distribution of f t+1  S0 mod 2
over S0 2 ~S is suciently close to uniform.
5 Open Problems
It remains to nd additional constructions within this framework based on other
assumptions; in particular, lattice-based constructions may be possible. It would
also be interesting to extend this framework to accommodate stronger secu-
rity requirements, such as CCA-security. Finally, constructing a fully collusion-
resistant IBE from the QR assumption in the standard model remains a chal-
lenging open problem.
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